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=ROWiQ3UDQWQHU  
 
Yemen and the Socialist Countries 
 
The traditional aims of the Former Czarist Empire in the Middle East and 
Arabia expanded with new dimensions after the Bolshevik Revolution. The 
efforts to gain overrule over Persia and to threaten the British positions in India 
were replaced by the vision of a global socialist revolution. At this point the 
Russians stressed the importance of the role of some undeveloped and colonial 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin-America. Because of this, after 1920 the 
Bolsheviks slowly started to focus on these countries and tried to find the 
opportunity to build up relations with the leaders of the sovereign states and the 
popular-nationalist movements of the colonies. First they achieved this in 
Arabia in 1923 when they opened their general consulate in Jiddah. 
In the period under investigation the soviet foreign policy had the potential 
opportunity to build up relations only with two countries in the Arabian 
Peninsula: Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The aim of the present essay is to show 
the backgrounds, periods and results of the established relations in the case of 
the latter state on the basis of the Western press and sources until September 
ZKHQWKHV\VWHPRI,PƗmate was overthrown. 
 
Yemen and the Soviet Union between 1928±1938 
 
,PƗP <DK\Ɨ had to face a number of difficulties after the World War I. 
when he started to organise the new Yemeni administration and to consolidate 
the internal politics after the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops. His centralist 
policy led to riots in the circle of the tribes that enjoyed wide autonomy before. 
Additionally, he had to drive out Emir IdrƯVƯ with force from the occupied 
7LKƗmah plain and he continuously confronted with the British in Aden 
because of the border-question; his relations with them aggravated by the 
PLGGOHRIWKH¶V+HZRQWKHVXSSRUWRI,WDO\IRUKLVVWUXJJOHDWWKHVDPH
time Rome sold obsolete weapons and industrial products of poor quality at a 
high price and also aimed to gain the control over the country, too. To decrease 
back the Italian influence and strengthen the commerce, reduced by the British 
pressure, in December, 1927 the Yemeni ruler ordered his son Prince 
Muhammad to contact the Soviet agents in Jiddah and to suggest establishing 
interstate relations on official level.1 
                                                 
1 As the Prince wrote in his letter: ÄAt present our Government persistently expresses its 
desire to establish mutual understanding with the Eastern people, especially with those who hold 
progressive views and who fight against imperialist oppression. The Great Russian Government 
vigilantly guards the interests of the Eastern peoples. The imperialists are fighting this 
Government, spending enormous sums of money and applying military and political force to 
prevent the peoples of the East from being educated in the spirit of freedom. This Government is 
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Earlier the Russian also showed interest for Yemen, too.2 Thus, the 
negotiations were finished quickly for the satisfaction of both sides on 1st 
November, 1928 they signed a trade and friendly agreement for ten years. 
Though in the first agreement they signed with an Arabic state, the Soviets 
acknowledged Yemen as a sovereign kingdom and emphasised its equality with 
them they were not allowed to establish a diplomatic agency in Yemen. They 
solely got permission for the operation of a permanent trading delegation with 
diplomatic privilege.3  
Shortly after the signature of the agreement, the Yemeni markets were 
overflown with the oil-products of Napthexport Company and the Soviets 
continuously organised exhibitions of agricultural equipments and machineries 
in Hudaydah and Sanaa. Besides, they exported great amounts of wheat, sugar, 
starch, soap, cement, wood, cloth, toilet-articles and shoes to the country.4 The 
Yemeni market slowly became dependent on the Soviets; however, the ,PƗP 
succeeded in realising his aims that he expected from the treaty: the economic 
penetration of the Soviets and their dynamic headway triggered serious 
concerns in Great Britain and in other Western countries. 
Parallel to the advance of commercial relations the Soviets wanted to ensure 
medical aid too. They established an assistance mission in Sanaa, which 
consisted of two doctors, a dentist, an engineer and a governmental trading 
commissioner.5 There were also initiatives for the building up of cultural 
relations between the two countries. They sent Soviet journals to the country and 
                                                                                                                      
winning the sympathy of the oppressed peoples. We hope that good relations will be established 
between our two Governments.´ LUKIN, V.: The Soviet Union and the Arab Countries. 
International Affaires (Moscow), 1962, V. 87. 
2 7KH HQYR\V IOHG WR (ULWUHD LQ 'HFHPEHU  IRU D VKRUW SHULRG ZKHQ WKH ZDKKƗEEƯWHV
occupied Jiddah. During their presence they collected some useful pieces of information about 
<HPHQLQWKH,WDOLDQFRORQ\,QWKLVWLPH,EQ6DǥǌGDVZHOODVWKH<HPHQL,PƗPZHUHORRNHGDW
by the Comintern as the leaders of a developing anti-British nationalist movement. Soon after 
this they had to disappoint when this ArabLF µUHYROXWLRQDULHV¶ WXUQHG RXW WR EH ZLOOLQJ WR
negotiate with the British. PAGE, S.: The USSR and Arabia. The Central Asian Research Centre, 
London 1971. 16-17. 
3 However, one of the articles of the contract stressed that the Soviet Union had right to 
appoint a permanent agent in Sanaa, if any other country is allowed to do the same. Soviet 
and Arabia. Treaty with Ruler of the Yemen, Times, January 25, 1929. Soviet Activity in 
Arabia. Text of Yemen Treaty, Times, August 16, 1929. Text of treaty of friendship and 
commerce between Yemen and the U.S.S.R., effective June 25, 1929. Oriente Moderno, 8, 
1928, 394. 
4 The Soviet dynamism and the acceptance of their low prices are perfectly presented by the 
fact that they carried nearly 22.000 tons of goods to Yemen from the ratification of the trade 
agreement in 1929 to 1931. However, it is more expressive to examine the distribution of these 
goods. According to this, the Yemenis imported apart from the agricultural equipment fifty per 
cent of its petrol, sixty per cent of its soap, thirty-five per cent of its sugar and eighty per cent of 
its wood materials form Russia. PAGE, S.: op.cit. 17. WENNER, M. W.: Modern Yemen 1918±
1966. The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1967. 155. 
5 MACRO, E.: Yemen and the Western World. C. Hurst & Co. London 1968. 113. 
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a film-making expedition in 1929 Äwith the aim of revealing the lies spread by 
LPSHULDOLVWSURSDJDQGD´ and making ÄWKHILUVWDXWKHQWLFILOP´ about Yemen.6  
At the beginning the Yemeni±Soviet relations seemed to be enormously 
successful, but after some years the interest in the maintenance of the previous 
G\QDPLVP FRQWLQXRXVO\ GHFOLQHG RQ WKH6RYLHW¶V VLGH%HFDXVH RI WKH HFRQRPLF
conditions of the Soviet Union it was not possible for them to take actively 
advantages of the strategic position of Yemen in this period. The staff working in 
the country became indifferent and their work reached dead-point, when the ,PƗP 
embarrassed their activity. In addition to this, the Soviets, seeing the expansive 
German and Italian foreign policy, looked for cooperation with the British from the 
middle of the 1930s, which among others demanded a radical change in their 
Arabian policy. After all, the entire delegation in Yemen was ordered home to 
report on the failure of the mission and their private material affaires.7  
Finally the outbreak of the World War made it possible to stop the Italian 
influence on the Eastern bank of the Red Sea. They were forced out from East 
Africa by the Allied Forces meanwhile their agents in Yemen were deported by 
the ,PƗP ordered by the British. After that the activity of the Russians was 
desultory and haphazard until May 1944, when Yemeni emigrants established 
the Free Yemeni Party in Aden. This time the Soviets tried to latch on to the 
Yemeni internal affaires representing themselves as the advancer of the 
movement. But after a short time it turned out that their efforts were useless, 
thus, they gave up their attempts.8 
 
The revival of the Soviet±Yemeni relations 
 
After the World War II, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was focused 
importantly on Europe and on international problems.9 They carried on a 
                                                 
6 The ,PƗPZDVSUHVHQWHGDVDSRSXODUQDWLRQDOLVWOHDGHUZKRVXFFHHGHGLQFRQVROLGDWLQJWKH
sovereignty of his country by signing the treaty with the Soviet Union. At the same time they 
recognised the abject conditions of the inhabitants, they blamed the landlords and merchants and the 
British in Aden inducing border incidents for the circumstances of the people. PAGE, S.: op.cit. 17. 
7 Those who returned home fell victim to the purge raging in the Soviet Union in these years. 
The others ± two men ± fled to Jiddah, where they converted to the Muslim religion. MACRO, 
E.: op.cit. 113. 
8 In Western circles it caused worries to hear that the Free Yemen Party was under Soviet 
influence. After all, the investigation soon showed that this was not true. Therefore, in 
accordance with the previous experiences, they estimated that Moscow considered the Yemeni 
movement solely as a possibility to overthrow an actual non-communist system. In spite of this, 
the British did everything to prevent that the Yemeni opposition and the Soviets build up 
UHODWLRQV$IWHUWKLVWKHUHZDVQRWDQ\HVVHQWLDODWWHPSWIURPWKH6RYLHWV¶VLGHWRHQWHU<HPHQ
until 1955, though they followed the events in internal politics. AL-RASHID, I.: Yemen Enters 
the Modern World. Secret U.S. Documents on the Rise of the Second Power on the Arabian 
Peninsula. Chapel Hill, N.C. Documentary Publications, Vol. VI. 1984. 120-121. 
9 Moscow did not give up its plans in the Middle East during the World War II. It was 
expressed first by Molotov during the negotiations about Four-Power Pact when he declared the 
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militant propaganda with the Arabic countries, contravened the emerging 
Arabic unity movement, confined the Muslim citizens in practicing their faith, 
supported the establishment of Israel and failed to revive the relations of the 
interwar years with the Arabic states. For instance, ,PƗP <DK\Ɨ was strongly 
criticized instead of being supported in his fights against the British on the 
southern part of his country. Yemen was disapproved in the Soviet books and 
articles on several occasions referring to the archaic form its governments and 
the medieval structure of the society albeit that its ruler continued his fight 
against the British across the border.10 
After Stalin¶V GHDWK WKHUH ZDV DQ HVVHQWLDO VKLIW LQ WKH 6RYLHW IRUHLJQ
policy. The new, more flexible policy towards the developing world took 
effects slowly. The communist ideology and the previous anti-Islam 
propaganda campaigns meant a seriously restrained power for the Arabic 
countries, which made possible for them to take the advantages offered by 
the Soviet Union only in 1955.  
Ahmad, the descendant of the ,PƗP <DK\Ɨ ± assassinated in 1948 ± 
continued the policy of the previous ruler aiming at the expulsion of the British 
in these years. This caused increasing border incidents between Yemen and the 
Southern Yemeni areas occupied by the British, in spite of the British±Yemeni 
agreement of 1950. It created a great opportunity for the Soviets that the rulers 
of the Protectorate arranged with each other to unite their state in a federation 
and parallel to this Great Britain attempted to strengthen its influence in the 
highland and in the circles of the tribes across the disputed border zone. This 
meant not only the failure of the formation of a µ*UHDW <HPHQ¶ for Ahmad, 
but there was a serious danger that a pro-British state will come into being , 
which would be strong enougK WRRYHUWKURZ WKH ,PƗmate-system and would 
be attractive for the adumbrated ShƗIL¶Ư sect. For insuring against the danger 
Ahmad begun to support with money and weapon the dissident elements of 
the Protectorate to create a buffer zone between his state and the territory of 
the British and its allies. He needed foreign support to realise this plan, 
because his country was rather poor. Additionally, there was an inland claim 
for modernising the country ± especially after the repression of the 
insurrection of 1955 ± the accomplishment of which was urged by the 
migrant groups, the members of the royal family and particularly the Crown 
Prince, Muhammad al-Badr. 
                                                                                                                      
claim of the Soviet Union to the territories south from Batum and Baku in the direction to the 
Persian Gulf. They came forward with their second unsuccessful suggestion in the Potsdam 
Conference, where they expressed that they would like to extend their control over the former 
Italian colony, Lybia. 
10 In the Soviet encyclopaedias Yemen was described as ÄD IHXGDO DEVROXWLVW VWDWH RI
ODQGRZQHUVDQGRIWUDGLQJDQGXVXUHUERXUJHRLVLHEXLOWRQWKHRFUDWLFIRXQGDWLRQV´, which was 
ÄLQVHPL-FRORQLDOGHSHQGHQFHIURPWKH$PHULFDQDQG%ULWLVKLPSHULDOLVP´ with ÄDQWL-SRSXODU´ 
rulers and government. PAGE, S.: op.cit. 20. 
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In this situation the Soviet Union had several exceptional opportunities 
unlike those Western countries that showed great interest. Beside to its growing 
popularity among the Arabs its anti-imperialist policy and its previous friendly 
relations with the country were of great importance. Another significant feature 
was that at the beginning of 1955 Yemen, Egypt and Saudi Arabia declared 
their isolations from the Baghdad Pact and started negotiations to create its own 
defence pact. In the view of Moscow this meant another blow to the West and 
an opportunity to be the army-supplier of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in case the 
Egyptian arms-business proved to be successful.11 
Making use of the opportunities of the situation preferred by Moscow from 
many aspects in October 1955 they took their first step to revive the previous 
relations with Yemen, when Daniel Solod, the Soviet Ambassador in Egypt 
met the Yemeni Foreign Minister in the capital of Egypt.12 On 31st October 
they agreed in to revive of the treaty of friendship of 1928 for five years, to 
establish diplomatic relations on official level, to exchange representatives and 
to strengthen trading and economic relations.13 By this time Great Britain did 
not take into account the treaty and the pieces of news about the Soviet±
Yemeni commercial negotiations in Cairo, due to its false estimation.14 
Therefore, it was a huge surprise for them to learn from the press about the 
negotiations of the Soviet mission in Yemen, which was followed by the 
signature of the commercial treaty on 8th March 1956. According to this 
agreement, the Soviet Union delivered smaller factories, agricultural machinery 
                                                 
11 ,PƗP$KPDGGLGQRWLQFOLQHWRMRLQDQDOOLDQFHLQZKLFKWKH%ULWLVKKDGPHPEHUVKLS.LQJ
6DǥǌGZKRZDV WKHPDLQ VXSSRUWHU RI3UHVLGHQW1ƗVLU LQ WKLV WLPH FRQVLGHUHG WKH3DFW DV DQ
opportunity for the growth of power of its greatest enemy, the Hashemite dynasty. In the 
YLHZSRLQW RI1ƗVLU WKH%DJKGDG3DFWZDV HTXDOZLWK WKHZHDNHQLQJRI KLV OHDGLQJ UROH LQ WKH
0LGGOH(DVWLQIDYRXURIKLV,UDTLULYDOVZKRFRXOGGHIHDW1ƗVLU¶VSDQ-Arab ambitions from the 
dominant position reached by the Western weapon deliveries. 
12 Surely, the Soviet desire to use the country as µMXPSLQJ-off-SRLQW¶ for entering to East-
Africa and obtaining influence there played an important role along with ideological reasons, the 
displacement of Great Britain from the Persian Gulf, the ImƗP¶V WUDGLWLRQDO DQWL-Western 
motivation and that the British-Yemeni conflict was getting critical. Gaining control over the 
6WUDLWV RI %ƗE DO-Mandab could have made it possible for them to bring Eritrea under their 
auspices and to build fortifications neaU 6KD\NK 6DǥƯG ,Q FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKLV VRYLHW ZULWHUV
alluded to the idea of establishing air route between India and the Malagasy Republic (formerly 
Madagascar), where Yemen should be an intermediary stop. WENNER, M. W.: op.cit. 176-177. 
13 5XVVLD¶V 0LGGle East Moves. Growing Initiative. Stronger Ties with Yemen, Times, 
October 18, 1955. Soviet Treaty with Yemen. Friendship Revived. Times, November 1, 1955. 
14 Although the British were fully aware of the Soviet offer that they build factories and 
routes as well as develop the agriculture in return for coffee, tobacco and agricultural products, 
they questioned the successful realisation of the agreement. They came to a false conclusion; 
remembering the ,PƗP¶V VXVSLFLRXV DWWLWXGH WRZDUGV WKH IRUHLJQHUV DQG WKH <HPHQL
underdeveloped economic situation they thought that the Yemeni partner would not be able to 
VXFFHHGLQVHQGLQJWKHHTXLYDOHQWVIRUWKH6RYLHWJRRGVWKH,PƗPZRXOGQRWSHUPLWWKHSUHVHQFH
of the Soviet technicians in the country and the Yemenis would be incapable of using the 
delivered installations or carrying out the various projects without assistance. INGRAMS, D. ± 
INGRAMS, L. (ed.): Records of Yemen 1798±1960. Vol. 12. Archive Editions, 1993. 430±431. 
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and ¶LQGXVWULDO HTXLSPHQW¶ ± secretly including weapons in the value of 5 
million pounds ± oil products, wheal and rice in exchange for Yemeni hides, 
coffee and other commodities.15 The expression of µH[FKDQJH¶ meant 
essentially a polite phrasing in this case because the Soviets were aware of the 
fact from the beginning that the value of the expected material would be 
minimal in return for their huge support.16  
GamƗl µAbd al-1ƗVLr, President of the United Arab Republic organised a 
meeting in Jiddah in April 1956 reacting to the formation of the Baghdad Pact, 
where they came to an agreement on 21st April. According to this, his country, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen created their own defence treaty and established a 
collective military leadership aiming to unite the command of the military 
forces of the three countries.17 After the negotiations King SaǥǌG gave weapons 
to Yemen to arm the dissident elements in Aden. Moreover, he transferred a 
great amount of money ± 3 million dollars, according to some claims ± 
officially for the modernisation of the Hudaydah harbour, but indeed to buy 
more weapons. The United Arab Republic sent military advisers for training 
the Yemeni Army.18 
                                                 
15 Even if the agreement meant a big surprise for the British diplomats in the region, - due 
to the lack of reliable sources ± they doubted its effectiveness and considered the claims of the 
press to be exaggerated. Their views were based on the reports coming from Hudaydah 
according to which the Russian mission made only a half success during the negotiations in 
Yemen. Also, they attached negligible importance to the Yemeni discussions of the two-
member Czechoslovakian mission because they were not informed about a particular part of 
the Soviet±Yemeni treaty dealing with the delivery of the armaments. The report of the 
Soviet±Yemeni agreement caused more serious concerns in Washington. Undersecretary John 
Dulles concluded ± regarding the growing intensity of the relations between the Soviet and 
Yemeni diplomats residing in Cairo and the fact that the weapon delivery from the Soviet 
Union to the countries of the Middle East is getting more and more intense ± that the trading 
agreement of the 8th March can most probably be estimated as a sign of the possibility that the 
Yemenis will buy weapons from the Soviets. ALMADHAGI, A. N. K.: Yemen and the United 
States. A Study of a Small Power and Super-state Relationship 1962-1994. I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Ltd., London 1996. 22. BISSEL, Richard, E.: Soviet Use of Proxies in the Third World: The 
Case of Yemen, Soviet Studies, Vol. 30. No. 1. 1978. 90. INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. 
(ed.): op.cit. Vol. 12. 436. 
16 The trade agreement with Yemen was not an individual case because we have to see it as a 
manifestation of orientation change in the Russian trade in 1955/56. This is proved by the fact 
that total trade turnover of the Communist countries with the underdeveloped countries showed a 
rise by more than 70 per cent over the figures of 1953. The same tendency appeared in 
connection with the Middle East; the trade with the region grew more than double within two 
years. On the basis of these, the Soviets hoped for their growing prestige in the Arabic states and 
expected form the patronized countries to support the Soviet aims in their diplomacy. MACRO, 
E.: op.cit. 114. PAGE, S.: op.cit. 32. 
17 Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen in Military Pact. Unified Command Agreement Reached 
at Jeddah, Times, April 23, 1956. A Tripartite Arab Defence Treaty Between Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen, International Affairs (Moscow), 1956, VIII, 157-160. 
18 INGRAMS, H.: The Yemen. Imams, Rulers & Revolutions. Camelot Press Ltd, London, 
1963. 92. 
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We have to estimate the weapons given by Saudi Arabia chiefly as moral 
support since the quality and quantity of the weapons did not meet the Yemeni 
demands. Another problem was the money for the modernisation of the 
Yemeni Army came from Saudi Arabia; the provided amount proved not to be 
enough. Yemen had to find new sources because Great Britain was successful 
in impeding the selling of weapons of the Western countries to Yemen by using 
its diplomatic and economic influence. Therefore, the procurement of modern 
weapons was realisable only from the Eastern Bloc. President 1ƗVLU ± 
becoming enthusiastic about the success of the previous Egyptian±
Czechoslovakian weapon business ± saw the solution of the problem in the 
expansion of relations with the socialist countries. It can be assumed that in 
May the visit of the Czechoslovakian mission in Yemen ± where he certainly 
discussed about weapon selling apart from diplomatic and educational 
questions with the Crown Prince ± could have happened owing to his 
intercession.19  
It was likewise due to President NƗVLU¶VSHUVRQDODVVLVWDQFHWKDWWKH<HPHQL
Crown Prince, al-Badr was invited to Moscow, which the latter accepted 
gladly. So he paid a visit not only in the Soviet Union, but in Eastern Germany 
and Czechoslovakia, too, between May and September. He signed a variety of 
agreements concerning the interstate relations ± establishment of diplomatic 
relations, trade and payment agreements, friendship, economic and technical 
assistance treaties ± and made arrangements about constructing factories and 
delivering large supply of weapons in return for deferred repayment over many 
years. He also agreed with the Soviet Government to exchange diplomatic 
representatives µLQWKHQHDUIXWXUH¶. Furthermore, Moscow agreed to extend an 
interest-free credit of approximately 32 dollars million for ten years. One half 
of this loan could be repaid in form of coffee and had to be turned to the 
construction of roads, factories and the modern port of Hudaydah, as the other 
half was a military aid, which had to be repaid in cash. During the sessions, Al-
Badr also granted concessions to the Soviet Union for oil prospecting and for 
uranium extraction.20 
The discussions in the socialist countries showed considerable perspectives 
for the development of Yemen. However, a small part of the signed pacts were 
realised, so the visits of the Crown Prince gave negligible practical results 
especially due to ,PƗP Ahmad.21 
                                                 
19 INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 12. 461. 
20 INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 12. 466-473. 477-479. MACRO, E.: 
op.cit. 115-116. PAGE, S.: op.cit. 33. Yemen Prince in Moscow. Desire to Strengthen Mutual 
Ties, Times, June 12, 1956. Moscow and the Yemen, Times, June 25, 1956. Soviet Relations with 
Yemen, Times, June 25, 1956. 
21 The Yemeni ruler was very disappointed, when he realised that his son signed treaties 
especially concerning on the delivery of factories and necessary goods for the modernisation of 
the country instead of the delivery of tanks and weapons. This must have been the reason why 
the Eastern German and Czechoslovakian commercial delegations failed in the negotiations for 
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The armament of the Yemeni army 
 
The rocket-threat to London, Paris and Tel Aviv enlarged exceptionally the 
Soviet prestige and popularity in the Arabic countries during the Suez Crisis of 
1956. For them, it was of advantage that Great Britain participated in the 
conflict and sustained defeat, suffered a loss of prestige in the region. 1ƗVLUist 
disturbances inspired by the Cairo Radio emerged not only in Aden, but in the 
other Persian Gulf Protectorates under British control.  
The Soviets were prepared to turn this favourable situation to advantage. 
There were clashes of changing intensity along southern boundaries of Yemen 
between the troops of the ,PƗP and those of the British and its allies during 
1957. The reaction on the conflict generated a daily occurring vitriolic 
propaganda campaign for the condemnation the µ%ULWLVKDJJUHVVLRQ¶ in Cairo, 
Sanaa and ± to much lesser extent ± Moscow from the beginning of the year. 
Recruiting centres were opened in Moscow, Cairo and Damascus, where they 
welcomed the volunteers, who wanted to fight for the Yemeni case.22  
Although the report of a great number of volunteers failed, the Soviets began 
to deliver the military equipment according to the previous treaties. Allegedly, on 
12th October 1956 a Russian ship carrying among others 20 anti-aircraft guns and 
sugar boarded and was packed out at night by the order of the Crown Prince near 
Salif.23 At the end of November, the Soviet Smela ship discharged another 15 
Czechoslovakian anti-aircraft guns, small arms, ammunition and other kinds of 
military equipment at the same place.24 Soon rumours were afloat that there were 
fighters in the cargo, which were debarked too.25  
                                                                                                                      
building a cement factory. Moreover, the Czechoslovakians were not able to displace the 
Western Germans prospecting for oil, moreover, neither the glass and rubber factory established 
by the Eastern Germans nor the concessions given to the Soviets were mentioned. INGRAMS, 
D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 12. 474±475. 
22 Concerning Moscow it came to light soon that the recruitment of volunteers stuck on the 
level of moral support. There is no data about a Soviet citizen who arrived in Yemen to volunteer 
to fight for the ,PƗP3$*(6op.cit. 37. 
23 INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 12. 475. 
24 Although the weapons were mainly given to equip the army, rifles were distributed among 
WKH WULEHV DORQJ WKH ERUGHU DQG WKH ,PƗPLVW IRUFHV OLYLQJ LQ WKH $GHQ 3URWHFWRUDWe from the 
EHJLQQLQJ7KH<HPHQLUXOHUGHPDQGHGDVVXUDQFHVIURPWKHUHFHLYHUVRWKDWODWHUWKH\GRQ¶WXVH
WKHVHDUPVDJDLQVW<HPHQLVHYHU\WULEHWKDWVXSSRUWHGWKH,PƗPKDGWRJLYHDKRVWDJHIRUHYHU\
ten rifles. 2¶%$//$1&((The War in the Yemen. London, Faber and Faber Limited, 1971. 
56. Yemen Rifles for Aden Tribesmen. Attempt to Cause Disruption, Times, December 31, 1957. 
25 From October 1956 there were some non-affirmed rumours according to which MIG 
fighters would arrive to Yemen, which would be run by Soviet pilots until the Yemeni pilots get 
military training. But the authenticity of these rumours was questioned by the fact that the 
fighters mentioned were of MIG-16 type, which the Soviets had never used. It was another 
critical problem that the airports of the country were inadequate for receiving and stationing 
PRGHUQ DLUSODQHV 7KHUHIRUH WKH ,PƗP RUGHUHG WR PDNH WKH QHFHVVDU\ VWHSV WR GHYHORS DQG
rebuild them, and after the innovations the Soviets delivered indeed 20 YAK fighters to Yemen. 
 
 
gW.RQWLQHQV(|WY|V/RUiQG7XGRPiQ\HJ\HWHP%XGDSHVW 
  
169 
The Egyptians sent advisers to establish training centres in Sanaa and 
Hudaydah, where they could give instructions the Yemeni regular forces how to 
use the newly delivered automatic weapons. The ,PƗP sent a mission to Cairo in 
January 1957 to clarify the conditions of the additional armament of the Yemeni 
Army by Russian weapons with a delegation of eight people paid by the Soviets. 
According to the arranged treaty by this occasion a ship called Muiz with three 
cargoes of weapons on the board arrived from the direction of Suez and boarded 
likewise near Salif between 18th February 1957 and the beginning of April, which 
was followed by additional discharges during June and July. Thirty-five Soviet 
military instructors arrived with the same ship full of rockets, tanks and thousands 
of tons of ammunition.26 Additional two cargoes arrived at the beginning of 
August; more infantry weapons, anti-aircraft guns, light and heavy field artilleries, 
SU- 100 self-propelled guns, T-34 tanks and armoured troop carriers and 
substantial amounts of ammunition were discharged.27 The seventh supply arrived 
one week later with further Eastern European technicians to bring the new 
armaments in action.28 In the last week of August eight shipments of military 
equipment arrived.29 Together with this, the total value of the delivered goods 
                                                                                                                      
Later on a beginner Yemeni pilot tried to run one of them, but the plane crashed a few seconds 
after the take-off. The other planes stayed at the airports without being used. The planes 
delivered by ships later had not been used either. The packed planes were taken to stores and left 
there undone. INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 12. 475±476, 487. 
2¶%$//$1&((op.cit. 56. 
26 ,WZDVDIRUWXQDWHVLWXDWLRQIRUWKH6RYLHWVWKDWWKH,PƗPFRQVLGHUHGWKHDVVLVWDQFHRI
the Eastern Block less dangerous for his regime than the Egyptian aid. Seeing President 
1ƗVLU¶V JURZLQJ SRSXODULW\ KH ZDV DIUDLG WKDW KLV FRXQWU\ FRXOG EH D YDVVDO RI Cairo in 
return for its aid. In the case of the Soviet technicians arriving in the country a connection 
between them and the Yemeni citizens seemed to be impossible for him because they were 
not Arabs and most of them did not speak the Arabic language and considering this, it 
seemed to be unlikely that these would act against the system of the country. WENNER, M. 
W.: op.cit. 185. 
27 INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 13. 123. 
28 From January 1957 at least four socialist military trainers worked in Sanaa. Their 
number continuously increased; four Soviet officers and nine Czechoslovakian technicians 
of the Skoda Company trained ten officers of the Yemeni Army for using the new weapons 
in April according to the pieces of information the British had. In September there were 
altogether 57 Czechoslovakian experts and technicians and 58 Soviet officers with those 
ones who arrived to the country with the deliveries in the summer of 1957. Another 
Shipment of Soviet Arms for Yemen, Times, August 10, 1957. INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, 
L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 12. 81. 84. 114. 
29 Until the end of 1957 the Soviet Union delivered to Yemen about 30 T±34 tanks, 56 SU-
100 self-propelled artilleries, at least 20 piston-engine YAK-11 and IL-10 aircrafts, 2 
helicopters, at least 74 BTR-40 armoured personnel carrier, 106 37mm light anti-aircraft gun, 
at least 52 57mm anti-tank guns, 30 122mm and 73 766mm field artilleries, 10 rocket 
launchers, and several tons of ammunition, small arms, machine guns, landmines, rockets, 
flamethrowers in great quantities with mobile cranes as well as workshops, trailers, troop 
carrier lorries and vehicles of different types together with the last cargo. INGRAMS, D. ± 
INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 13. 127. 
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reached 5 million pounds (3 million dollars), which corresponded one third of the 
budget of approximately 10 million dollars.30 
The instructors achieved a half success in training during their activity. 
They succeeded in teaching the Yemenis how to use the automatic weapons 
and anti-aircraft guns; although the punctuality left much to be desired in the 
latter case. The delivered tanks, fighters, artilleries, anti-tank guns and troop 
carriers proved to be in vain. On the one hand, the strategically lagged Yemeni 
army was incapable of bringing these armaments into action answering to the 
pace of takeover. On the other hand, it turned out soon that the mountainous 
area on the Yemeni frontier is not appropriate for the effective application of 
these weapons. Therefore, the ,PƗP put the greater part of the delivered goods 
into stores, next to the weapons that they got from Germany before the World 
War II. He forbade handling these arms, because he was afraid that later on his 
relatives or some nationalist groups would make use of the better equipped and 
more effective army to overthrow him.31  
After all, the problems concerning the usage of weapons did not affect the 
Soviet-Yemeni relations. Irrespective of the application or avoidance of the 
equipments, the Soviets succeeded to gain not only the approval of the leaders 
of the Yemeni army, but also the friendship of the Crown Prince due to the 
continuous delivery. The cooperation with Moscow and the socialist countries 
was not restricted on the one-sided military assistance. The rapidly expanding 
relations were shown by the fact that the ,PƗP accepted the offer of the 
Czechoslovakian Government to train a number of Yemenis in engineering and 
medicine at Czechoslovakian universities for six month without charge. The 
trade continuously expanded between Yemen and the Soviet Union between 
1957 and early 1958, several Eastern European technical missions visited the 
country, where a group of Soviet specialists worked on agricultural and mineral 
development schemes and more than hundred socialist experts worked in 
various fields.32 
                                                 
30 .LQJ6DǥǌGJDYHWKH$PHULFDQV± who were worried about the arms shipment ± an answer 
WRWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZFRXOG,PƗP$KPDGDOORZKLPVHOIVXFKDJUHDWYROXPHRISXUFKDVHZLWK
minimal finances of his state: Ä7KH,PƗPKDVHQRXJKPRQH\+HKDVEHHQKRDUGLQJUL\DOV± he is 
very miserly. We have given him PLOOLRQWREXLOGWKH3RUWRI+XGD\GDK«ZHPXVWWDNHLQWR
DFFRXQW WKH ZD\ WKH\ GR WKLQJV «´ DRESCH, P.: A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000. 82. 
31 PAGE, S.: op.cit. 37-38. 
32 In January 1957 two Soviet doctors began their practices in Hudaydah. Two other Russian 
engineers examined the conditions of building a new harbour at Ras al-Khatib on the spot, to the 
north of Hudaydah, meanwhile nineteen of their Eastern German colleagues worked in 
Hudaydah, Bajil and Sanaa to construct a cement-factory, the public-lightning and the telephone-
centre. After a year there were more than 140 experts of which more than 40 people ± among 
others four Czechoslovakian doctors with their families, seven Eastern German experts from the 
Siemens Ltd. and six Yugoslavian pilots ± came from Eastern Europe. Their full number grew 
over 180 by the end of the year. INGRAMS, D. - INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 12. 176. 184. 
INGRAMS, D. - INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 13. 79-81. 84. 
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Another Yemeni trip through Eastern Europe 
 
The continuous frontier incidents and the reports about large quantities of 
socialist armaments arriving to Yemen caused serious distress in Great 
Britain.33 This is why they invited Prince al-Badr in September 1957 to London 
to discuss the settled situation fulfilling the offer of the ,PƗP made one month 
earlier.34 The Crown Prince met the invitation and negotiated with British 
authorities about the question in London between 10th and 21st November. But 
neither side moved from its previous statement and the session was a total 
failure for the Yemenis. The British not only refused the attempts of the Prince 
concerning Aden and the Protectorates, but they declared the establishment of a 
new military command in Aden and proposed many constitutional changes to 
drive back the ,PƗP¶VLQIOXHQFH  
Before the discussions in London ,PƗP Ahmad ordered his son ± if the 
assistance of the socialist countries proves to be not enough ± to force 
concessions from the British to visit the Eastern European countries again and 
make more treaties with them. Therefore, al-Badr immediately made another trip 
through the Eastern Bloc after the failure in London and visited Rumania, 
3RODQG <XJRVODYLD WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ DQG WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD
between 9th December 1957 and 29th January 1958. His mission was successful; 
he managed to come to an agreement with Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania 
about establishing diplomatic relations, exchanging of representatives within a 
fixed term and about commercial, scientific, economic and technician 
cooperation.35 For the Soviets, the negotiation of the Yemeni delegation in China 
was more considerable. In spite of the fact that on 21st August 1956 Yemen 
formally recognised the communist China, and agreed on establishing diplomatic 
relations at ministerial level, this was not followed by further agreements. 
However, when the Crown Prince arrived in Peking he was nicely welcomed. 
This also ZDVVKRZQLQWKHMRLQWFRPPXQLTXpZKHUH&KLQDXQDQLPRXVO\DVVXUHG
its support about the aims of Yemen in connection with the retrieval of the 
territories occupied by the British. They signed friendship and economic treaties, 
                                                 
33 Great Britain essentially was not worried about the armament deliveries from the socialist 
countries; they did not think that the Yemeni army armed by the socialist countries meant more 
dangerous strategic threat than before. They attached much more importance to its effects in the 
circle of the rulers of the Protectorate, and in the international propaganda. 
34 3UHVXPDEO\.LQJ6DǥǌGPDQDJHGWRFRQYLQFH,PƗP$KPDGWRVROYHWKHFRQIOLFWVLWXDWLRQ
with Great Britain through negotiations. Like London the Saudi Arabian ruler was worried about 
the armaments-export to Yemen. Therefore, he offered material support to prevent that the 
Soviets gain influence in Arabia. He was willing to support al-%DGU¶VFODLPIRUWKHWKURQHDQGWKH
claims of the Yemenis in connection with the Protectorate, if the country cuts back the relations 
with the Eastern Block and stabilizes its connections with the West. INGRAMS, D. ± 
INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 13. 194. 
35 INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 13. 159. 164-172. 214-235. 
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as commercial, technician, scientific and cultural cooperation. Most important 
was the 10-year interest free loan of 70 million Swiss franks (about 16,380,000 
dollars), where the Chinese ensured to finance the realisation of various light 
industries projects and the road construction between Taǥizz±Hudaydah±Sanaa. 
In addition to the material and technician assistance, this agreement still made 
possible for Yemeni technicians to be trained in China and for many Chinese 
experts and labourers to work in Yemen.36  
The Chinese±Yemeni treaties extended the East±West rivalry in the Cold 
War, and were the roots of the Chinese±Soviet competition for Yemen, too.37 
The Crown Prince did not finish the negotiations in Peking, when the Soviets 
prepared an agreement for him by offering a loan of 25 million dollars (100 
million rouble) for a 15-year period at a 2,5 per cent interest rate.38 Parallel to 
this, they opened their embassy in TaǥL]]SURSRVHGµXQFRQGLWLRQDODVVLVWDQFH¶
on the fields of public health, irrigation, hygiene, education and public works 
during a five-year term. Moreover, the construction of the new harbour near 
Ras al-Khatib and of seven new airports was started in spring under their 
control.39 Their relations with Yemen did not change after the country became 
member of the United Arab Republic; Moscow focused on the realisation of the 
admitted obligations.  
The visit of the Yemeni delegation in Moscow in December 1959 got great 
publicity, where the Soviet government agreed to put one part of the loan of 20 
million rouble assessed in 1956 to develop the agriculture ± especially for 
growing cotton and cereals ±, to build dams and to supply irrigation 
apparatuses for making the greater part of the 7LKƗmah plain adaptable for 
                                                 
36 After a slow beginning, Chinese engineers and technicians arrived in huge numbers to 
Yemen from November 1958. Accordingly, the number of their staff increased to four hundred 
until the end of the year. China Provides Loan for Yemen, Times, 14 January, 1958. INGRAMS, 
D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 13. 184. 238-255. INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): 
op.cit. Vol. 14. 66. 
37 There were many alternative reasons why China chose Yemen in the competition for the 
influence in the Middle East. Surely, cardinal viewpoint was the fact that Yemen was one of the 
most backward countries of the Middle East. This being the case they could compete with the 
Soviet contributions offering minimal aid-programmes which did not burden the Chinese 
HFRQRP\ ,GHRORJLFDOO\ WKH DVVLVWDQFH RI D µUHDFWLRQDU\ WKHRFUDWLF¶ VWDWHZKLFKZDV LQ FRQIOLFW
with the imperialists was important, too. Namely this support made possible for them to begin 
refuting their reputation of being revolutionary extremists and to be more acceptable to the 
nationalist government of developing countries. It is also possible that they noticed the 
importance of the strategic location of Yemen because they could not only threaten the oil-supply 
routes, but it could be a perfect springboard for the penetration into East Africa in case they have 
a strong influence there. BISSEL, Richard E.: op.cit. 91. PAGE, S.: op.cit. 38-39.  
38 /DWHUWKH,PƗPDFFHSWHGRQO\VL[W\SHUFHQWPLOOLRQGROODUV PLOOLRQURXEOHRIWKH
offered money for constructing routes, dams, and public health buildings, for harbour 
modernisation and for mineral deposits exploration. ATTAR, Mohamed Said el-: Le Sous 
'pYHORSSHPHQW (FRQRPLTXH HW 6RFLDO GH <pPHQ 3HUVSHFWLYHV GH OD 5pYROXWLRQ <pPHQLWH. 
Algiers, 1964. 215. 
39 INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 13. 187. 
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farming.40 This is why the Soviet economic assistance focused on financing 
agricultural and communication projects after 1958, which was repaid in form 
of Yemeni commodities and agricultural products. Although this programme 
was not of a large volume, the considerable part of the Yemeni export went to 
the Soviet Union in 1960 on account of repaying the loan within commercial 
framework. The number of Soviet and Chinese technicians working in Yemen 
radically rose within a short time; their complement was estimated Ä700 
&KLQHVH DQG (XURSHDQ FRPPXQLVWV´ in the middle of 1960 and again to 
more than 1100 by the end of the year.41 
The technical assistance made it possible for many Yemeni students to do 
medical, engineering, technological and agricultural studies in the Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, or China.42 Furthermore, due to the cultural agreement 
with China Yemeni journalists visited China in 1958 and the Chinese shot a 
film in Yemen next year. A delegation led by the brother-in-law of ,PƗP 
Ahmad visited the Chinese Muslim communities on the invitation of the 
Chinese Islamic Association in 1960, and an exhibition of Chinese goods that 
reached the most important Yemeni cities.43  
 
The weakening of the influence of the socialist countries 
 
There was a considerable development progress in Yemen due to the 
Chinese and the Soviets. However, their presence and their continuous 
                                                 
40 Due to the low efficiency of agricultural production the inhabitants depended eminently on weather 
conditions. Because of the frequent drought it happened quite often that the majority of the population had 
to starve most of the year. This was the case for example in 1959, when the Soviet Union and the 
Americans delivered 10.000 tonnes wheat as an aid in the emerged catastrophe situation. Most probably 
this event was the cause of the redeployment of the credit-treaty signed previously to finance agricultural 
projects. INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 14. 67, 81. 
41 The labour-intensive methods of the Chinese and their dislike for occupying local labours 
were the reasons for their presence in great numbers in the country. This caused disapproval from 
the beginning in leading circles, which was further augmented by the foreign behaviour of the 
Chinese from the Yemeni circumstances, like showing films, publishing periodicals, their Trade 
8QLRQ¶VDFWLYLW\WUDYHOOLQJLQWKHFRXQWU\ZLWKRXWSHUPLVVLRQRUVLPSO\GLVWULEXWLQJULFHDPRQJ
the starving population. The main problem of the suspicious ruler in connection with them was 
that they did not have any secret police which could keep an eye on them. Thence, on the one 
hand he asked for officers from Cairo to establish such a secret service, on the other hand he 
forbade the entering of further communists to the country. GULDESCU, S.: Yemen: The War 
and the Haradh Conference, Review of politics. 28, No. 3, (Jl 66) 321.; INGRAMS, D. ± 
INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 14. 75.; PAGE, S.: op.cit. 49. 
42 Due to the scholarships offered by the socialist countries the number of the Yemenis 
studying abroad doubled within three years. About 500 young people studied in other countries 
in 1958 and their number grew to 1020 until the school year of 1960/1961. 236 students took part 
in higher education or technician training in a socialist country, 76 of them in China, 50 in 
Eastern Germany, 40 in Czechoslovakia, 36 in the Soviet Union, 20 in Yugoslavia, 6 in Hungary, 
4 in Rumania and 4 in Albania. ATTAR, Mohamed Said el-: op.cit. 96-97. 
43 PAGE, S.: op.cit. 49. 
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assistance did not grant the friendship of Yemen that started to appear in 1958. 
,PƗP Ahmad was very much worried about the presence of the socialist 
technicians in the country, whom he suspected of conspiring against him and 
his regime behind his back. His animosity grew more, when in 1958 President 
1ƗVLU practically forced the Yemeni ruler to decision namely that Yemen would 
get the additional support from his country on condition that the socialist 
presence and assistance was cut back.44 
The presence of the socialist countries in Yemen was staggering when 
,PƗP Ahmad expressed his desire for a less ÄSRVLWLYH´ and more ÄneutUDO´ 
position in his foreign policy apart from the dispute in Aden. Their position 
worsened more when President 1ƗVLU¶V DQWL-communist comments were 
welcomed not only by the Yemeni citizens, unsatisfied with the abuses of 
the Soviet technicians and with the practices of the Chinese in their 
occupation, but it caused discredit towards them by their previous firm 
supporter, Prince al-Badr too.45 
The Soviets had to face many problems concerning the realisation of some 
treaties signed earlier. It was a great disappointment for them that the ,PƗP 
refused to repay the delivered weapons or to give concessions, which caused 
the gradual stopping of the military support from August 1957. It also 
embittered them that they did not succeed in accomplishing their main aim, 
namely to influence the population and the army. The ruler continuously 
discouraged the activity of the instructors of the Soviet military; their function 
was increasingly taken over by the Egyptians.46  
                                                 
44 The communist support of the Iraqi regime after the revolution in July 1958 resulted in 
political tension between the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union. Presumably this 
DIIHFWHG3UHVLGHQW1ƗVLUE\KLVDLPWROLPLWWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHVRFLDOLVWFRXQWULHVLQ<HPHQDQG
to assure his position. It was a perfect occasion for him, when he learnt that some Soviet military 
LQVWDOODWLRQVKDGEHHQEXLOWQHDU6KD\NK6DǥƯGRQWKe Red Sea coast for ruling the Perim Island 
controlled by the British and for constructing a naval and submarine base near Ras al-Khatib. 
After this the Egyptian leader ± alluding to the insecurity of trade in the Suez Canal ± informed 
al-Badr that in that IXWXUHKLV FRXQWU\ZRXOGQRW VXSSRUW ,PƗP$KPDG¶VPLOLWDU\SURYRFDWLRQV
with Soviet equipment and trainers against Aden. 5XVVLDQ¶V+DUERXU:RUN IRU <HPHQ Ä*XQ
Emplacements on Red Sea, Times, April 3, 1958. Construction of Naval Base, Times, April 17, 
1958. WENNER, M. W.: op.cit. 186.  
45 Prince al-%DGULQIRUPHG3UHVLGHQW1ƗVLULQ0DUFKWKDWVRPH<HPHQLFLWL]HQVSHOWHG
Chinese workers with stone thanks to his anti-communist speeches. Parallel to this the relations 
aggravated between the socialist experWVDQGWKHJURZLQJO\GLVDSSRLQWHG,PƗPDQGKLVRIILFLDOV
due to the hitches in the building process of the new harbour. INGRAMS, D. - INGRAMS, L. 
(ed.): op.cit. Vol. 14. 50. Page, S.: op.cit. 49. 
46 5DKP\¶V RSLQLRQ LV WKDW WKH VRFLDOLVW FRXQWULHV GLG QRW GH liver more weapons to 
Yemen after August 1957. But his idea disagrees with the declaration of the Crown 
Prince on 2nd July 1958. According to this there was a ÄFRQWLQXRXVIORZRIDUPVIURPWKH
8665LQWR<HPHQ´. RAHMY, Ali Abdel Rahman: The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World. 
Intervention in Yemen, 1962±1967. University Press of America, Washington 1983. 80. 
ROUCEK, J. S.: Yemen in Geopolitics, Contemporary Review, 202 (1163), December 
1962. 315. 
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Shortly after the beginning of the work it also turned out that the 
construction of the planed new harbour near Ras al-Khatib was impossible 
because of the quicksand. For a compensation they strengthened and enlarged 
the dam of the Hudaydah harbour, but they met some other problems when 
they begun the construction of the new route between the harbour and the city. 
The content of the µXQFRQGLWLRQHG DVVLVWDQFH¶ was not mentioned anymore, 
except for the arrival of those Russian doctors who had a bad reputation in a 
short time among the population.47 
It led to further problems that the establishment of the United Arab Republic 
and then the United Arabic States became another reason for further 
disturbances in the territory of Aden and the Protectorate. Many rulers of then 
Protectorate worried about the growing influence of the Arab nationalism and 
the strengthening of the military potential of the ,PƗP. Therefore, they revived 
the plan of federation protected by the British when the British-Yemeni 
conciliation discussions in the Ethiopian Diredawa failed in July 1958 like the 
previous conference in London. Soon, an agreement came into being between 
the parties concerned due to the interdependence and the Federation of the 
Arab Emirates of the South was declared in February 1959.48 
The formation of the South Arabian Federation led to a new situation in the 
foreign policy of ,PƗP Ahmad. The British supported six sultanates and three 
sheikhdoms which closely encompassed North Yemen and the army of the 
union was as large as the ,PƗP¶VWURRSV7KH,PƗP¶VSRVLWLRQZRUVHQHGPRUH
in the region, when the tribes of the so-called Free Yemen joined the 
Federation. Estimating the new danger appearing on the borders of his 
countries, ,PƗP Ahmad practically managed to terminate the frontier incidents 
absolutely and decided to cut back slowly the Egyptian and socialist assistance 
that he considered rather irrelevant, meanwhile he opened in his foreign policy 
towards Aden. 
His belief was affirmed by the internal chaos that ruled the country between 
April and August 1959 when he left for Italy to obtain medical care. During his 
absence al-Badr, appointed regent agreed with President NƗVLU that the latter 
would send large numbers of Egyptian advisers and technicians to Yemen and 
introduced VRPH µSURJUHVVLYH¶ UHIRUPVZKLFKZHUH SUHYLRXVO\ FDUULHG RXW LQ
the socialist countries.49 This process caused the growing of the Egyptian 
                                                 
47 Alike the Soviets the Czechoslovakian had to confront many diVDSSRLQWPHQWV7KH,PƗP
gave a concession for prospecting oil to an American Oil Company and at the same time he 
IRUEDGH WKH &]HFKRVORYDNLDQ H[SORUDWLRQ WHDP WR FRQWLQXH WKHLU ZRUN RQ WKH 7LKƗPDK SODLQ
Later he was afraid of loosing the loyalty of the army, therefore, he suspended the activity of the 
Czechoslovakian instructors, too. But it meant a more serious disappointment for them that the 
ruler denied paying ± some 20 million dollars ± for the weapons which were delivered in 1956. 
(INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. Vol. 13. 188. 
48 INGRAMS, H.: op.cit. 106. PAGE, S.: op.cit. 50. WENNER, M. W.: op.cit. 186. 
49 The Crown Prince as an appointed ruler set up a Representative Council of seven members 
and discharged many conservative officers including the commander-in-chief to modernise the 
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influence parallel to the weakening of the central authority. There were 
disturbances all over the country and the army became nearby disorganised by 
the time Ahmad came back home. Therefore, after his returning the ,PƗP 
discharged the Egyptian advisers from their position, suspended all of those 
decrees of his son he considered radical and repressed the reform movements 
originating in the new decrees. To prevent the occurrence of the same events in 
the future he signed further treaties with Western powers and companies and 
later he rejected the aid offers of the Egyptian government.50  
There were new attempts to the approach of the Yemeni±British interests in 
the summer of 1960, but the effort proved to be a failure like the previous ones. 
Another socialist aid streamed to the country in large quantities, but at the same 
time the ,PƗP agreed with the Americans to build the MukhƗ¶-7Dǥizz-Sanaa 
road, to establish the water-supply system of Taǥizz and the construction of a 
dam. At the beginning of 1961 the Yemeni ruler agreed with the Soviets about 
the realisation and financing of further plans and signed treaties with North 
Korea and Yugoslavia.51  
The previous friendly relations between Yemen and Egypt had aggravated 
by 1961 because the cooperation attempts had failed.52 Thus, when Syria 
withdrew from the United Arab Republic on 28th September, the Yemeni ruler 
composed a poem about his doubts and complaints concerning the Arab 
socialism of President NƗVLU. The results were the announcement of the 
destruction of the United Arab States on 26th December, the termination of 
diplomatic relations, the mutual critics and charges in the press and the start of 
the planning and organising of the overthrow of the ImƗmate-system.  
                                                                                                                      
army. Furthermore he dismissed some confidential helpers of his father who abused their power 
or did not do their work carelessly and appointed Egyptian officers and experts to replace them. 
As an unexpected consequence of the reforms there were soon disturbances in the circles of the 
army without leaders and the tribes, moreover, it was rumoured that the Crown Prince became 
the tool of Moscow and Cairo. Yemen Purge on Scale of Revolution. Radio Tributes to Crown 
Prince. Times, May 29, 1959. 
50 To counterbalance the socialist influence the Yemeni ruler signed a number of agreements 
among others with the West German Government and get into contact with the main opponent of 
the Russians, the United States, too. Although hH UHEXIIHG :DVKLQJWRQ¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ IRU
establishing a mission in the middle of 1957, two years later he permitted them to establish the 
diplomatic representation of the International Cooperation Administration in Yemen and came to 
an agreement with the United States Overseas Investment Corporation as a sign of approach to 
the West. WENNER, M. W.: op.cit. 187. 
51 The Middle East Journal, XV. No. 1. (Winter 1961) 68. The Middle East Journal, XV. No. 
2. (Spring 1961) 210. 
52 The development of the Egyptian±YemeQL UHODWLRQVZDV FRQWLQXRXVO\ EORFNHGE\ ,PƗP
$KPDG¶V GLVWUXVW RI 3UHVLGHQW 1ƗVLU 7KLV VLWXDWLRQ ZRUVHQHG EHFDXVH RI WKH DFWLYLWLHV RI WKH
(J\SWLDQH[SHUWVZKRZHUHSRSXODUDPRQJWKHLQKDELWDQWVVLQFHWKH,PƗP¶VDEVROXWHSRZHUZDV
threatened by the Arab nationalism promising the introduction of democratic and nationalist 
reforms. The gap between their views was deepened by the increasing vitriolic propaganda-
campaign against the absolutist power of the Yemeni ruler Cairo Radio after the official visit of 
Sir William Luce, Governor of Aden in February 1960. 
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This time the socialist countries counted as the main supporters of the 
United Arab Republic and the ,PƗP considered their ideology to be dangerous 
for the monarchy. Presumably this led to his conclusion that it was necessary to 
cut back the relations with the socialist countries and to expel their experts 
from the country to avoid the incidental sabotages. He orientated himself 
towards the Western countries and accepted western aid offers to compensate 
the missing socialist and Egyptian supports.53 Already this was shocking for the 
socialist states and they were much more surprised when the Yemeni ruler 
denied the payment for the finished works both of the Soviets and the Chinese 
and deported their experts from the country.54 It was another disappointment 
for the Soviets that the country did not support the standpoint of the socialist 
countries on international forums for repaying the economic favours. 
Nevertheless, they did not show obvious signs of their disappointment neither 
in the political life, nor in the press. The relations of the socialist countries with 
,PƗP Ahmad remained apparently friendly until his death on 19th September 
1962.55 Khrushchev emphasised in his message of condolence to al-Badr that 
Ahmad ÄKDG PDGH D ZRUWK\ FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH FDXVH RI FRQVROLGDWLQJ WKH
political and economic independence RI WKH <HPHQ´, and later the Soviet 
Government also congratulated in another message to al-Badr on his 
accession.56 The Soviets did no express any initial evaluation or expectation to 
the declared intention of the ruler to modernize and democratise the Yemeni 
society. But owing to the Revolution of 26th September he did not get the 
opportunity to prove his sincerity. 
As a consequence we can divide the relations of Yemen and the communist 
countries two phases. In the first period, the inter World War period the Soviets 
highly estimated Yemen on account of its fights against the British and its role 
                                                 
53 )RUH[DPSOHWKH,PƗPWXUQHGWRWKH86IRUVXSSRUWZKHQLQWKH+XGD\GDKILUHLQ
six hundred houses burnt down and three thousand people became homeless. In the same year 
he accepted the donation of four million dollars from the US to stabilise the adverse budget ± 
in 1961 the import was $16,836 million, while the export was only $8,161 million ± and 
additional six and three quarter millions in 1962. ATTAR, Mohamed Said el-: op.cit. 201. 
GULDESCU, S.: op.cit. 322. 
54 Saudi Arabia stopped supporting Yemen after the presence of the agents from the socialist 
countries, which caused adverse budget and the country became unable to pay. Therefore, it was 
a serious problem from the beginning of 1959 that the Yemenis were unable to fulfil their duties 
and to pay the salary of the experts, or the costs of the works. After finishing and opening the 
Sanaa± +XGD\GDK URDG ,PƗP $KPDG VDLG WR WKH &KLQHVH WKDW KH ZRXOG QRW SD\ DQ\ 0DULD
Theresa taller for it and they could bring it with them, if they wanted. The same happened with 
the Russians in June, when they finished the construction of the Hudaydah hospital and the new 
harbour named Ahmadi. DRESCH, P.: op.cit.  82. INGRAMS, D. ± INGRAMS, L. (ed.): op.cit. 
Vol. 14. 66. 2¶%$//$1&((op.cit. 56±57. 
55 The disappointment of the socialist countries appeared only in the drastic drop of the 
number of delivered machineries and equipment, which decreased the total trade turnover to one 
quarter. There are similar reasons for why the Russian did not begin another aid projects after 
accomplishing the port at Hudaydah. PAGE, S.: op.cit. 64±65. 
56 BIDWELL, R.: The Two Yemens. Westview Press, Boulder 1983. 126. 
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in the drawing back of the expansive Italian influence beside the economic 
elements. But the economic potential of the Soviet Union could not make 
possible to effectively taking advantages of the relations, so the contact broke 
mainly because of the changing of the international conditions due to the 
dynamic German and Italian rise in Europe. After all, the ten-year-long 
cooperation proved that the Soviet Union was able to dispense with the idea of 
socialist global revolution and the relations depended on the foreign policy and 
not on the internal system of the state. 
Thereafter, it became only in the middle of the 1950s possible to build up 
diplomatic relations again due to the changes in the foreign policy of Moscow, 
the decolonisation and the appearance of the thought of the Arab Unity. This 
time the granted support to Yemen by the Soviet Union together with other 
socialist countries was adapted for the realisation of the nationalist aims of the 
Arabic state. Therefore, they became popular and honoured in the country, 
which were not diminished by the antipathy of the inhabitants against the 
communist ideology. This circumstance proved to be balanced until the time 
when the Yemeni ruler considered this practically one-sided assistance to be 
GDQJHURXV7KH<HPHQL¶VGLVLQWHUHVWFKDQJHGDIWHUWKHIDOORIWKH8QLWHG$UDE
States and the activities of Cairo against the realm. This time the ,PƗP decided 
to cut back radically the previous dynamic relation to save the monarchy. 
